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Publicity Under Section 8(b) (4)
Of the Labor-Management Reporting
And Disclosure Act
I. Introduction
Publicity is an essential device in the arsenal of union weapons.
One type of publicity that can be particularly effective is that directed
at secondary employers.' The union hopes that the pressure generat-
ed by such publicity will cause the secondary employer to pressure the
primary employer to reach a settlement.
Endeavoring to curb union power, Congress wished to restrict a
union's ability to exert pressure on secondary employers. Congress
realized, however, that restrictions could not be so severe as to in-
fringe upon a union's first amendment right of free speech. The re-
sulting compromise was Section 8(b)(4) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act.2 The enactment severely restricts a union's ability to
exert pressure on the secondary employer, but also contains provi-
sions for publicizing labor disputes. These latter provisions are com-
monly referred to as the "publicity proviso."
The proviso protects union activity -that would otherwise be
unlawful under section 8(b)(4). The proviso does not permit unre-
strained publicity but rather ,regulates it. This comment will discuss
the acceptable forms of publicity, the requirements for such publicity,
and the effect of unlawful publicity (in the form of picketing)
combined with otherwise lawful publicity (handbilling). Initially
this comment will review the background of the proviso to aid in the
discussion of these topics.
I. The Development of the Publicity Proviso
A. Section 8(b)(4) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
The Labor-Management Relations Act was a reaction to the
1. A secondary employer is an employer other than the employer with whom
the workers are directly engaged in a labor dispute.
2. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT ch. 120, § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
3. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT ch. 120, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Wagner Act.4  The Wagner Act enumerated and prohibited unfair
labor practices; the LMRA balanced this by enumerating and
prohibiting unfair union practices. One of these unfair union prac-
tices was set forth in section 8(b)(4). 5  This section made it an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, trans-
port or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, mate-
rials, or commodities or to perform any services where an object
thereof is, [the achievement of enumerated prohibited goals]. 6
Implicitly, this section included prohibition of publicity directed at a
secondary employer that would fit within the scope of the above
quoted language. Especially important and relevant to the publicity
problem was subsection (A) of 8(b)(4), 7 which forbade sec-
ondary boycotts. 8  Union activities including publicity could not
force or require any employer or other person to cease handling the
products of any producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease
dealing with any person.
There was only one exception to this forbidden activity. Sec-
tion 8(b)(4) was covered by a proviso -that permitted any person to
refuse to enter the premises of any employer (other than his own), if
the employees of that employer were engaged in a strike approved by
their certified representative.
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970). The Labor Management Relations Act was
passed in 1947 because of a popular feeling that the Wagner Act had resulted in an
improper balance of power in labor relations. There was a basic misconception on
the public's part concerning the scope of the Wagner Act. The public felt that the
Act would eliminate all strikes and that an employer who was charged with an unfair
labor practice had no opportunity to defend himself. In reality the Act attempted
to eliminate only organizational strikes, and an employer who was charged with an
unfair labor practice did indeed have an opportunity to defend himself. These mis-
conceptions and others, when combined with the coal miner's strike during World
War II (despite a "No Strike" guarantee), led the public to clamor for a restoration
of the balance of power in labor relations. B. TAYLOR and F. WrrNEY, LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW 196 (1971).
4. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr ch. 372, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
5. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT ch. 120, § 8(b)(4), 61 STAT. 141
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 8(b)(4)(A).
8. A secondary boycott occurs when pressure is placed on one business unit
to force its cessation of business with another business unit with which the union
has a dispute.
While one intention of section 8(b)(4) was to limit the ability
of unions to use pressure, including publicity, on secondary employers,
several loopholes developed that defeated this purpose. The first
loophole resulted from the section's application to a "concerted refus-
al" of employees in the course of their employment to handle the
products of 'another employer. This implied that a union could
induce the cooperation of one employee of a neutral employer or
more than one employee on different occasions as neither would be
action "in concert."9  The second loophole occurred because the
section applied only to the inducement of "employees" of a neutral
employer. The section did not prohibit the inducement of a neutral
"employer" for the purpose of securing his cooperation in ceasing
to deal with the struck employer.' 0 The third major loophole of the
section developed because of the Act's limited definition of the terms
"employees" and "employers." A great number of both "employees"
and "employers" were not covered."
These loopholes were closed by the 1959 amendments to the
LMRA contained in the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act (LMRDA). 12 The amendments modified section 8(b)
(4)18 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, making it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agent
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual em-
ployed by any person engaged in commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any serv-
9. This view was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Int'l Rice Milling Co,, 341 U.S. 665 (1951). Because of this decision, it became
possible for a union to attempt to influence a "key employee" of a secondary em-
ployer, usually the neutral employer's purchasing agent.
10. The Board clearly supported this position of the law. In Texas Industries,
Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 923, 925 (1955) the Board stated, "The Act prohibits inducement
of employees only, not of employers, when an object of such inducement is to force
or require 'any employer ... to cease doing business with any other person.' " This
interpretation of the Act made it lawful for a union to apply secondary boycott pres-
sure against a neutral employer.
11. The Labor-Management Relations Act ch. 120, § 2(2), 61 STAT. 137
(1947) defined employers who were covered by the Act. Employers who were
not covered were the United States Government, any governmental corporation, state.
governments and their political subdivisions, nonprofit hospitals, and any employer
covered by the Railroad Labor Act. The Labor-Management Relations Act ch.
120, § 2(3), 61 STAT. 137 (1947), defined employees who were not covered by
the Act. Employees who were not covered by the Act included agricultural laborers,
domestic help, persons employed by their parents or spouse,. supervisors, independent
contractors, and anyone subject to the Railroad Labor Act.
12. PuB. L. No. 86-257 (1959).
13. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr ch. 120, § 8(b), 61 STAT. 141
(1947). Title VII of the Act contained several amendments to the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, Section 704 specifically designed to close the loop-




ices; or (ii) to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in ei-
ther case an object thereof is, [the achievement of enumerated
prohibited goals].1
4
This change eliminated the "loopholes" of the earlier version.
First, the activity directed toward neutral employers no longer had to
be "concerted." Now inducement of only one individual to cease
working would violate the law. Second a labor organization could
no longer threaten, coerce, or restrain an employer. The amended
section outlawed this activity when it was directed against any "per-
son," not merely employees. This change made secondary consumer
picketing unlawful since it exerted pressure against the secondary
employer. Last, the amended section removed the definitional defi-
ciencies of the terms "employees" and "employers" by using the terms
"individuals" and "persons." While the 1959 amendments made the
legislation more effective by closing the loopholes, they also softened
section 8(b)(4) by adding the publicity proviso. 15
B. The Creation of the Publicity Proviso
The "publicity proviso" states that,
for -the purpose of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity,
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public, including consumers and members of labor organizations,
that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are dis-
tributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not
have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any per-
son other than the primary employer in the course of his employ-
ment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or
not to perform any services, at the establishment of the em-
ployer engaged in such distribution.'1
This form of the proviso represents a compromise of the conflict
among the Senate, the House, and President Eisenhower regarding
the extent of protection of publicity that was required by the first
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970).
15. The amended section 8(b) (4) also contained several other changes. First,
the secondary boycott provision of 8(b)(4)(A) was moved to 8(b)(4)(B), and in
its place Congress foreclosed a sixth area as a legitimate objective of union pressure-
forcing the employer to enter into a "hot cargo" agreement. Secondly, the amended
8(b)(4)(B) included a "primary action proviso." This proviso stated that nothing
contained in subsection (B) would be construed to make unlawful any primary strike
or primary picketing unless it was unlawful for another reason.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
amendment. The Senate proposed to permit all forms of publicity,
the House proposed to prohibit publication to customers of neutral
employers, and President Eisenhower demanded a prohibition of
picketing that was intended to induce secondary boycotts.
Throughout the legislative debates there existed the fear that a
failure to allow certain forms of publicity would cause the entire
section to be declared unconstitutional. This was particularly appar-
ent in the Senate. Senator Humphrey urged the Senate to authorize
some forms of publicity of a labor dispute.' 7 He cited the court of
appeals reversal of an NLRB decision' s that held a "We Do Not
Patronize" list to be restraint and coercion of an employer. In
reversing, the Ninth Circuit 9 held that the union's listing and persua-
sion were within the general protection of the first amendment's free
speech guarantee. The Senator feared that the proposed amend-
ments of section 8(b)(4) without a publicity proviso would face this
same problem. He quoted from United States v. Hutchinson,20 which
stated that
publication, unaccompanied by violence, of a notice that the
employer is unfair to organized labor and requesting the public
not to patronize him is an exercise of the right of free speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment which cannot be made un-
lawful by Congress. 2
1
Although some congressmen shared Senator Humphrey's fears22
and agreed with the Senate position, the Senate's version of the
proviso would have gone so far as to permit picketing to induce
secondary consumer boycotts. The House of Representatives version
of section 8(b)(4) contained no provision that would specifical-
ly have allowed publication of a labor dispute to customers of a
neutral employer.23 Any use of publicity for inducing secondary
boycotts was to be prohibited. The House position was unacceptable
to the Senate.24 Before a conference committee resolution had been
17. 105 CONG. REc. 6232 (1959).
18. Alloy Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957).
19. N.L.R.B. v. I.A.M., Local 942, 36 L.C. 65, 214 (9th Cir. 1959).
20. 312 U.S. 219 (1940).
21. Id. at 243.
22. Congressman Griffin shared Senator Humphrey's fears. Discussing the
proposed legislation and its prohibitions the Congressman stated:
[W]hether it is the handing out of handbills or putting an ad in the paper or
picketing, if it is done in such a way so as clearly to be nothing more than
an exercise of free speech, then the provision would not be violated.
105 CONG. Rac. 15673 (1959).
23. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
24. Professor Archibald Cox was an advisor to Senator Kennedy during the
congressional consideration of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
Professor Cox believed that the Senate-House Conference Committee could have
agreed to allow labor organizations to organize a consumer boycott of a store that
sold products of a struck producer by any available means of publicity. Cox, The




reached, President Eisenhower delivered a radio and television speech
in which he demanded a prohibition against the use of picketing to
induce a secondary consumer boycott.25 After this speech the House
conferees became adamant that picketing would not be allowed as a
means of inducing a secondary consumer boycott.2 6 The Senate,
therefore, drafted a bill that allowed all forms of publicity other than
picketing.2 7  This is the form the bill took as it emerged from the
conference committee. The conference chairman, Senator John Ken-
nedy, explained the compromise proviso to the Senate.
We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit
picketing in front of a secondary shop, but were able to persuade
them to agree that the unions shall be free to conduct informa-
tional activity short of picketing. In other words, the union can
hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in the
newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can
carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in
front of a secondary site.
28
Congress' proscription of secondary consumer picketing, while
allowing other forms of publicity of a labor dispute, was clearly within
the guidelines laid down by the United States Supreme Court in 1940.
In Thornhill v. Alabama21 the Court had declared:
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Con-
stitution embraces at least the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint
or fear of subsequent punishment. . . . In the circumstances
of our times the dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area
of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. 0
The Court however, while recognizing a labor organization's right to
publicize a labor dispute, added a caveat that the right could be
limited to protect the interests of the state as a whole:
Abridgement of the liberty of such discussion can be justified
only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under cir-
25. President Eisenhower had long advocated this measure but did not throw
the full weight of his office behind it until the conference committee was to convene.
26. Cox, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. 105 CONG. REc. 17898-99 (1959). Professor Cox reflected on the matter
of the House-Senate compromises:
This is the reason for the proviso which permits unfair lists, radio broad-
casts, newspaper advertising, sound trucks, and every other form of publicity
except picketing, for the purpose of inducing consumers to boycott an unfair
product or a distributor who does business with an unfair producer.
Cox, supra note 24, at 274.
29. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
30. Id. at '101-02.
cumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas
for competition by acceptance in the market of public opinion.8'
Despite passage of the proviso, which seemed to protect the constitu-
tional guarantee of free speech, the matter of publicity of labor
disputes was not completely resolved. The publicity proviso left
certain areas of ambiguity.
C. Initial Ambiguities Concerning the Publicity Proviso
While both the Board and the courts generally agreed as to the
forms of publicity permitted by the proviso, there was uncertainty and
disagreement concerning the application of the proviso. Terms drafted
to achieve clarity proved ambiguous and created much disagree-
ment among the courts and the Board concerning the circumstances
in which the proviso was to be applied. These terms desperately
needed clarification, because if the proviso were found inapplicable,
any prohibited type of publicity would be unprotected and would
therefore constitute an unfair labor practice under 8(b)(4).
The first major ambiguity was whether the primary employer
involved in a labor dispute had to "produce" a tangible good in order
for the union's publication to fall within the protection of the proviso.
The courts and members of the Board were deeply divided on this
issue. Some 2 felt that in order for the union's publication activities
to be protected, the primary employer had to actually, physically
create a tangible good. Others3 took a less restrictive view and
contended that the union's publication activities would be protected if
the employer produced a product or in any way added his labor to
the production of a product. It was argued that an employer whose
business consisted of the distribution of another's product or the
performance of some service to aid in the production and sale of a
product was also an employer who "produced a product" within the
meaning of the proviso.
The issue was addressed in Lohman Sales Co.3 4 In this case the
union was engaged in a labor dispute with Lohman, a tobacco
distributor. The union handbilled in front of the retail stores Loh-
man serviced and asked the public not to buy products delivered to
the retail stores by Lohman. Lohman charged the union with a
31. Id. at 104-05.
32. This point of view was always taken by Board member Phillip R. Rodgers
in dissenting opinions and by some of the courts of appeals, particularly the Ninth
Circuit.
33. This point of view was always taken by the majority of the members of
the Board.
34. 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
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violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)B), 5 claiming the union was trying to
threaten, coerce, and restrain the retailers from doing business with
him. Lohman claimed the handbilling was not protected by the
proviso since Lohman, as the primary employer, did not actually pro-
duce, but only distributed a product. The Board dismissed this con-
tention and found that the proviso covered primary employers who
distributed goods as well as those who produced them. The Board
relied on a dictionary definition of "production, 3 6 stating:
[S]o far as human effort is concerned, labor is the prime requi-
site of one who produces. A wholesaler such as Lohman need
not be an actual manufacturer to add his labor in the form of
capital, enterprise, and service to the product he furnishes the
retailers. In this sense therefore, Lohman, as the other em-
ployer who "handled" the raw materials of the product before
him, is one of the producers of the cigarettes distributed by his
customers.
87
In this case and others -the Board emphasized that the primary
employer, by adding his labor in the form of capital, enterprise, and
service to the products that it advertised, distributed, or serviced for
the secondary employer, became one of the producers of that secon-
dary employer's product.
3 8
Not every court or all of the Board members agreed with this
interpretation. In Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB,"9
the court of appeals overturned a Board decision" that had classi-
fied a television station as a "producer of a product." The court
ruled that the term "product", "produced", and "production" had
35. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 704(a), 73
STAT. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii)(B) (1970).
36. The Board relied on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d edition 1933), which
defines production as follows:
In political economy. The creation of objects which create wealth. The
requisites of production are labor, capital, and the materials and motive
forces afforded by nature. Of these, labor and the raw materials of the
globe are primary and indispensible. Natural motive powers may be called
in to the assistance of labor and are a help, but not an essential of produc-
tion. The remaining requisite, capital, is itself the product of labor. Its
instrumentality in production is therefore, in reality, that of labor in an in-
direct shape. Mill, Political Economy; Wharton.
37. 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907 (1961).
38. Accord, Houston Armored Car Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 110 (1962) (primary
employer provided armored car service); Ypsilanti Press, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 991
(1962) (primary employer a newspaper company); Middle South Broadcasting Co.,
133 N.L.R.B. 1698 (1961) (primary employer a radio station); Great Western
Broadcasting Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1961) (primary employer a television sta-
tion).
39. 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962).
40. Great Western Broadcasting Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1961).
been restricted in their meaning by the context in which they were
used in other places in section 8(b)(4).41 The court ruled that as
the term "produced" was used in the proviso, "Congress was referring
to the activity of a -primary employer in applying capital, labor and
enterprise to effect the conversion of raw materials in his possession
into a more finished tangible article. '42 The court therefore declared
the publicity proviso inapplicable to this dispute. Without the pro-
tection of the proviso the union's conduct violated section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).43
The other major ambiguity springing from the equivocal termi-
nology of section 8(b)(4) and the publicity proviso was whether a
union could attempt to induce supervisors of neu-tral employers to
exercise their managerial discretion to cease doing business with the
primary employer without violating section 8(b)(4)(i)(B)." This
section made it unlawful to induce any individual to refuse to work on
any goods, or to perform any services, if the object of the inducement
was to force any person to cease doing business with any other
person.
This precise issue was raised in Carolina Lumber Co.,4 5 in
which a neutral supervisor refused to use the primary employer's
lumber after being informed of a labor dispute by a striking union.
After reviewing the legislative history of the section the Board dis-
missed the charged violation of section 8(b)(4)(i)(B), stating
that among the class of individuals to be insulated from "induce-
ment" are supervisors who, although they are management's rep-
resentatives at a low level, are through their work, associations,
and interests still closely aligned with those whom they direct and
oversee.48
The Board reasoned that the two clauses protected different individu-
als and forbade different activities. Clause (i) referred to induce-
ment of "any individual employed"; clause (ii) referred to threats,
restraint, and coercion of "any person engaged in commerce." The
Board stated that "to threaten a person is to induce him."47  If the
two separate clauses were to have meaning, some distinction must
have been intended. The Board felt that if the expression "individual
employed by any person" referred to high level supervisors, the spe-
41. In 29 U.S.C. § 158,(b) (4) (B) (1970) the term "product" is described as
being associated only with a "producer," "processor" or "manufacturer." This led the
court to conclude that Congress wanted to include within the coverage of the act only
those employers who created a product.
42. 310 F.2d 591,598 (9th Cir. 1962).
43. Accord, Servette, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 3,10 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962).
44. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 704(a), 73
Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (i) (B) (1970).
45. 130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1961).




cific prohibition against coercive tactics would have been unneces-
sary. The Board reconciled the clauses in regard to supervisors by
applying clause (i), "inducement of individuals employed by any
person," to those whose interests were near rank and file members,
i.e., low level supervisors, and by applying clause (ii), "threats, re-
straint or coercion of any person," to those who actually exercised
managerial discretion, i.e., high level supervisors. The authority of
the neutral supervisor 4s would have to be investigated in each case
to determine whether a neutral supervisor was subject to inducement
as an employee under clause (i).49
There was not complete agreement with this view of the prob-
lem. In Servette, Inc. v. NLRB,' ° the Ninth Circuit took the
opposite approach. The court concluded that the substitution by
Congress of the term "individual" for "employee" in the 1959 amend-
ment was conclusive proof that Congress intended to include supervi-
sors as "individuals" whom a union could not induce without violat-
ing section 8(b)(4)(i)(B). This meant that all supervisors, not just
low level supervisors, were to be protected from publicity aimed at
inducement. The court felt that the Board's creation of two ill-
defined categories would place a union in the "untenable and precari-
ous position"' of having to gamble on which supervisor they could
induce.
The Board's and courts' conflicts regarding the interpretation of
both the individuals who could not be subject to inducement through
publicity and the employers who were engaged in production needed
to be resolved. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court decided
two cases that clarified both of these major ambiguities.
D. Supreme Court Resolution of Ambiguities
In NLRB v. Servette, Inc.52 the United States Supreme Court
48. 29 U.S.C. § 152(10) (1970) describes a supervisor as follows:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or dis-
cipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
49. Accord, Staats Express, 131 N.L.R.B. 242 (1961); Peyton Packing Co., 131
N.L.R.B. 406 (1961); Alpert v. Teamsters Local 379, 184 F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass.
1960).
50. 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962), rev'g 133 N.LR.B. 1501 (1961).
51. 310 F.2d 659, 665 (9th Cir. 1962).
52. 377 U.S. 46 (1964), rev'g 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962).
directly addressed the two major areas of ambiguity-whether a
union could attempt to induce a supervisor to exercise his managerial
discretion to cease doing business with the employer with whom the
union had a labor dispute, and whether the primary employer actually
had to produce a tangible good in order for the union's publication
activities to fall within the scope of the proviso. A third issue,
whether the threat to handbill a neutral employer was a prohibited
"threat" under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), was also raised.
The Court found that the union, in asking managers not to
handle the goods that Servette distributed, was not asking them to
cease performing their managerial duties in order to force their
employers to cease doing business with Servette. The Court declared
that this type of activity had not been considered a violation of section
8(b) (4) (A) before 1959 and that the legislative history of the 1959
amendments made it clear that the amendments were not intended to
make such an appeal an unfair labor practice. The Court noted that
the purpose of the 1959 amendments was to close loopholes
in the application of section 8(b)(4)(A) and not to expand
the type of conduct that section 8(b)(4)(A) condemned. Thus
the inducement of supervisors to exercise their discretion to cease
dealing with the primary employer was not unlawful. The Court
discarded the reasoning of both the Board in Carolina Lumber
Co.53 and the court of appeals in Servette v. NLRB54 and stated
that the crucial test for union action in approaching supervisors is
whether the appeal is to the exercise of managerial discretion or to
the avoidance of duties for which they were hired.
Likewise, the Court ruled on the "produced" issue favora-
bly to the union position. The Court ruled that the term "produced"
as used in the publicity proviso did not mean that the primary
employer actually had to manufacture or process a tangible good. The
Court said that the proviso was an outgrowth of the Senate's concern
to guard the union's freedom to appeal to the public for sup-
port. The proviso would fall far short of achieving this purpose if it
applied only to cases of union disputes with processors or manufac-
turers. The Court noted that in the Fair Labor Standards Act55 the
term "produced" was defined as "produced, manufactured, mined,
handled, or in any manner worked on. . . ."I This definition was
known to Congress when it enacted the publicity proviso. The Court
stated that "produced" must be given a broad range lest it be ren-
dered superfluous.
53. 130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1961).
54. 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1970).
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The resolution of the third issue was also favorable to unions.
The Court ruled that warnings of handbillings did not constitute
"threats" as defined in clause (ii) of section 8(b) (4), stating that
the protection of handbill distribution by the proviso would be under-
mined if a threat to engage in such activity were not protected.
On the same day that the Court decided Servette, it ruled on
another case that dealt with the publicity proviso. In NLRB v.
Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760,"T the
Court ruled on whether secondary consumer picketing was lawful.
Secondary consumer picketing occurs when a union engaged in a
labor dispute pickets a neutral employer and asks the consuming
public to refrain from buying only the goods of the struck employer
handled by the neutral employer. The pickets do not ask the public
to cease all dealings with the neutral employer.
58
The Court viewed the legislative history of the 1959 amend-
ment and concluded that it did not "reflect with requisite clarity a
congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at
secondary sites. . . .,1 The Court recognized two types of con-
sumer picketing. The purpose of one was to shut off all trade with
the neutral employer unless he cooperated with the union; the pur-
pose of the other was .to limit the goods of the primary employer that
were bought by the public from the neutral employer. The first
typed induced the neutral employer to cease buying the struck prod-
uct because of the injury inflicted on his business generally. The
Court held this type of picketing unlawful. But the second type of
picketing, which asks the public to boycott only the goods of the
struck employer, keeps the union's appeal closely confined to the
primary dispute. The neutral employer will stop buying the primary
employer's goods because the demand for them has decreased, not
because his business is being injured. The union merely follows the
struck product, it does not create a separate dispute with the neutral
employer. This activity the Court ruled was lawful. The Court's
decision and a later case60 indicate, however, that a union's activities
57. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
58. The publicity proviso clearly states that picketing is not a form of publicity
available to unions. It states "nothing contained in such paragraph shall be con-
strued to prohibit publicity, other than picketing ...... 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1970).
59. 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964).
60. Hawaii Press Newspapers, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1967), af!'d, Honolulu
Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
directed at only the struck product or service will lose the protection
of the proviso if -they cause a general decrease in the neutral employ-
er's business."'
While the drafters of the publicity proviso apparently thought
they were prohibiting all picketing for secondary boycott purposes, 62
the Supreme Court interpreted this langugage differently. But, the
courts found other restraints and requirements for publicity implicit
within the proviso.
HI. Requirements That All Publicity Must Fulfill Under -the Public-
ity Proviso
Even though the form of publicity that a labor organization
utilizes is one that has usually been recognized by the Board and
courts,63 it must meet other requirements to fall within the protection
of the proviso, requirements that are implicit in the proviso itself.
The publicity must meet all of the requirements; a failure to do so will
place the publicity outside the protection of the proviso, subjecting
the union to a charge of violating section 8(b)(4).
A. A Labor Dispute Must Exist
The first requirement that a union must meet in order for its
publicity to fall within the protection of the proviso is that it must be
engaged in a labor dispute with the employer against whom the pub-
licity is ultimately directed. A labor dispute includes
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of persons in ne-
gotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee. 64
The usual issue that arises in this context is what constitutes a
labor dispute. This is illustrated in Cedar Crest Hats, Inc. v. United
Hatters, Cap, and Millinery Workers International Union.6" The
case involved the union's attempt to organize the millinery workers of
the Dallas, Texas area. The union, able to organize only one compa-
ny, started a nationwide education program, which included threaten-
ing retailers with handbilling that would ask the public to buy only
61. An example of this would occur if a restaurant advertised in a paper that
was being struck. Secondary consumer picketing would urge the public not to buy
any of the goods that the primary employer helped to produce. In this case that
would mean a total cessation of the restaurant's business because all of its "products"
were advertised in the struck newspaper.
62. See note 28 supra.
63. See notes 99-137 and accompanying text intra.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970).




union-made hats. The district court 6 issued an injunction restraining
the union. The court of appeals, after reviewing the activity and the
definition of a labor dispute, held that the union's activity fell within
the proviso because a labor dispute did exist between the union and
the millinery manufacturers. Therefore, the activity was protected,
and the district court injunction was laid aside.
Another attempt to define labor disputes arose in Roywood
Corp. v. IBEW Local 1264.67 In this case the employer television
station broke off collective bargaining in February, 1966, at which
time the union went on strike and publicized the dispute by
various means. In May, 1967, the Board conducted a representa-
tion election.6" The union was soundly defeated, but continued
to publicize its original dispute with the television station. The
union finally agreed to stop the publicity. In a suit for damages
from the union's activities the court, ruling in the employer's favor,
found that there was not a bona fide labor dispute. Since a repre-
sentative election had been held within the past twelve months, the
union was no longer engaged in a "labor dispute" with the employ-
er.0
9
B. The Publicity Must Be Substantially Truthful
The second requirement is that the publicity must be substantial-
ly truthful. In Lohman Sales Co.7 0 the Board stated this basic rule:
[T]he proviso does not require that a handbiller be an insurer that
the content of the handbill be one hundred percent correct, and
that where, as here, there is no evidence of an intent to deceive
and there has not been a substantial departure from fact, the
requirements of the proviso are met.71
The Board stated that it is necessary that the publicity be "substantial-
ly accurate" in its representations. In practice this is not a stringent
standard. For example, in Packard Bell Electronics,72 the company
66. Texas Millinery Co. v. United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Int'l
Union, 229 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
67. 290 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ala. 1968).
68. The Board conducted the election as required in 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1970) makes it unlawful for a union to picket
an employer in the hope of threatening him to recognize the union as the representa-
tive of his employers when a valid election has been conducted within the preceding
twelve months.
70. 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
71. Id. at 906.
72. 132 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1961).
service department was out on strike. The union handed out leaflets
stating that Packard Bell products were made under non-union condi-
tions. In fact, the manufacturing division's employees had voted not
-to be represented by a labor organization. The Board felt that
although the handbills were misleading, the statutory requirements of
substantial truthfulness had been met.
Another example is found in California Association of Employ-
ers," in which the Board ruled that the publicity had failed to meet
the substantial accuracy requirement. In this case the union distrib-
uted handbills that said the contractor hired employees who worked
for less than union rates. In fact, the contractor's employees received
$6.83 an hour in wages and fringe benefits while union men
received only $6.73 an hour. The union official in charge of the
handbilling stated at the hearing that he had never bothered to
investigate to discover what the contractor's employees were being
paid. The Board ruled that the handbills were not only misleading
but untrue when they stated that the union standards were higher
than those of the contractor. In light of the falsity of the handbills
and the fact that they were issued with reckless disregard for the
truth, the Board held that they were not protected by the proviso.
Similarly, in Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB74
the court of appeals upheld a Board determination7 5 that hand-
bills distributed in front of a market place asking the public "not to
patronize this establishment" were untruthful. This determination
was based on the handbills' reference to the entire establishment
when only a small number of stores76 in the market place were ac-
tually advertising in the newspaper against which the union was strik-
ing. The Court would not rule whether the publicity might be
protected because the union had not acted with flagrant disregard of
the accuracy of the publicity, since this point had not been raised
before the Board."
C. Geographical Limitation on the Publicity
A third issue that arises in regard to publicity is whether any
geographical limitation should be imposed upon a union's publicity
campaign. In most cases, publicity at the point where the neutral
employer sells the struck employer's goods is most effective. But on
73. 190 N.L.R.B. 261 (1971).
74. 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968), aff'g 167 N.L.R.B. 1030 ('1967).
75. Hawaii Press Newspapers, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1967).
76. There were 50 to 60 shops in the market place, of which only six were
regular advertisers.
77. The court found that the publicity was illegal for other reasons also. See




occasion a union will publicize the dispute elsewhere. While there is
usually no geographic limitation imposed, the Board or courts may
find limitations necessary in some circumstances.
The normal absence of limitations is illustrated in Schepps Gro-
cery18 and Sakowitz, Inc. 9 In Schepps Grocery80 the union and the
struck employer stipulated that the union would not publicize the
dispute in front of the retail grocery stores to which the struck
employer delivered for a period of thirty days. During this period,
the union distributed handbills from house to house in the vicinity of
the retail stores, but never at the stores themselves. The Board found
that the expansion of the area of publicity did not violate section
8(b)(4)(B) and held that the publicity remained protected by the
proviso. In Sakowitz, Inc.81 the union was engaged in a labor
dispute with a contractor involved in a shopping mall construction
project. The union handbilled a store of one of the companies that
planned to rent space in the new shopping center. The General
Council of the Board contended that a union may engage in a sec-
ondary consumer boycott only if the secondary employer conducts
his business with the neutral employer. The Board rejected this
argument, holding that
[,t]he absence of a geographical limitation to the scope of the pro-
viso is inherent in the fact that radio and newspaper advertising
is within the scope of its protection. To restrict the locus of
permissible handbilling while protecting appeals to all prospec-
tive customers who listen to radios or read newspapers would
be patently inconsistent.
82
The Board concluded that the union's handbilling was protected by
the publicity proviso.
But in Raywood Corp. v. IBEW Local 126481 the district court
indicated that there was a geographical limitation to the proviso. The
union sent placards to labor organizations throughout the country
asking them not to buy the products of the companies that advertised
on the struck television station. Most of these companies sold their
goods both in the Alabama region and nationally. The court con-
cluded that this publicity was not protected by the proviso. Not only
78. 133 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1961).
79. 174 N.L.R.B. 362 (1969).
80. 133 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1961).
81. 174 N.L.R.B. 362 (1969).
82. Id. at 364.
83. 290 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ala. 1968).
did the publicity hurt the local distributors of the companies, but it
also affected distributors in others parts of the country who had no
connection with the advertising on the struck television station. The
court, therefore, imposed a geographical limitation on union publicity
that harms completely disinterested neutral employers.
D. The Publicity Must Not Be Intended to Induce Employees of the
Neutral Employer to Cease Working
The last requirement that publicity must meet is that it cannot
be directed toward inducing the employees of the neutral employer to
stop working.8 4 The proviso states that publicity is protected
as long as [it] does not have an effect of inducing any individual
employed by any person other than the primary employer in
the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or
transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the es-
tablishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.8 5
Any publicity that is not protected by the proviso because it is
intended to induce an individual to cease working almost automatical-
ly violates section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 6
In Lohman Sales Co., 7 the union, which was engaged in the
handbilling of retail stores, asked the employees of several of the
retailers "not to order from Lohman." None of the employees were
supervisors who exercised any managerial discretion in deciding what
company to purchase from. The Board found that these oral re-
quests constituted inducement of employees not to perform their work
and that they attempted to force the neutral employer to cease doing
business with Lohman."8 The Board indicated that this constituted
inducement of the neutral employer's employees for the purpose of
altering the relationship between the neutral and primary employer,
and would not be protected by the proviso. Similarly, in Carolina
Lumber Co., 9 union agents approached workmen of the neutral em-
ployer and told them that it was wrong for them to handle the pri-
mary employer's lumber because it would "bust" their union. Al-
though the crew did not stop working on the job, the Board held
that this was a violation of section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) because the union
84. Of course the union can still attempt to induce a supervisor to exercise his
managerial discretion and not deal with the struck employer. See notes 52-54 and
accompanying text supra.
85. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (1970) makes it unlawful for a union to
induce or encourage any individual to engage in a strike or a refusal to perform his
duties where an object of such inducement is to require one person to cease dealing
with another person. If the union engages in inducement of an individual to cease
working, this is not protected by the proviso and is an action prohibited by the Act.
87. 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
88. This was a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (1970).
89. 130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1961).
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agents had attempted to induce the workmen to cease performing
their jobs. The success or failure of the inducement was immaterial
to the finding of a section 8(b)(4) violation.
E. Attempts to Impose Additional Requirements
While the above discussed requirements for publicity proviso
protection are commonly recognized, occasional attempts have been
made to add further impediments. These attempts have been in the
form of ordinances and have generally arisen in communities where
anti-union feelings exist. A common attempt to further restrict pub-
licity is the enactment of anti-littering statutes directed at discourag-
ing handbilling. Their purpose is to prevent a union from notifying
the public of the labor dispute that exists. The courts have usually
refused to enforce these laws where the enforcement would be pat-
ently unconstitutional. This is illustrated in Steelworkers v. Bag-
well.90 This case involved an ordinance 9 of the town of Statesville,
North Carolina that made it unlawful to distribute without permit
any leaflet except those dealing with politics or religion. The union
wished to solicit members through handbilling. The district court92
refused to issue an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit observed that the district court had im-
properly abstained from issuing the injunction, adding that
[a] municipality may prohibit ,the distribution of commercial ad-
vertisements on its streets and the throwing of litter on its side-
walks, but its interest in keeping the street clean does not war-
rant an ordinance forbidding the distribution to willing recipients
of handbills expressing ideas and opinions.
93
The court declared that the ordinance was plainly unconstitutional as
a violation of the first amendment free speech guarantee.
Another attempt to impose additional restrictions had been di-
rected toward the use of sound trucks. In both Saia v. New York94
and Kovacs v. Cooper,9 the Court ruled that the use of sound
trucks was not absolutely protected by the first amendment but was
subject to regulation. In the latter case the Court upheld a city ordi-
nance which prohibited the use of any sound truck that emitted
90. 66 L.R.R.M. 1157 (4th Cir. 1967).
91. ST ATESViLLE, N.C. CODE § 14-5 (1947).
92. 239 F. Supp. 626 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
93. 66 L.R.R.M. 2257, 2259 (4th Cir. 1967).
94. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
95. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
loud and raucous noises in a public place. The Court stated,
"Opportunity to gain the public's ear by objectionably amplified
sound on the streets is no more assured by the right of free speech
than is unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on the street."96
Relying on these two Supreme Court decisions, the Supreme
Court of California in Wollman v. City of Palm Springs9" struck down
a city ordinance98 that prohibited sound trucks from traveling less
than ten miles per hour unless they were stopped for traffic, and
from emitting sound for more: than one minute when they were
stopped. A union which had intended to use a sound truck to publi-
cize a labor dispute brought suit to have the ordinance struck down.
The court agreed with the union charge that the ordinance violated
the first amendment because it exceeded the burden of reasonable
regulations.
The effort to limit the use of sound trucks and handbilling
indicates that some forms of publicity have been more readily ac-
cepted than others. While a few municipalities have opposed the use
of these two types of publicity, the Board and courts have generally
recognized them.
IV. Forms of Publicity That May Be Utilized
A few specific forms of publicity have been considered lawful
since the 1959 amendments.9 9 Although the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in 1964 concerning the publicity proviso did not consider what
forms of publicity were allowable under the proviso, the Board and
the courts have often considered the matter.
A. Handbilling
Handbilling is the most common form of publicity utilized by
labor organizations to inform the public' that a neutral employer is
selling goods produced by the employer with whom the labor organi-
zation has a dispute. In handbills unions are able to describe the cir-
cumstances of a labor dispute more accurately than in picket signs.
There is little doubt that handbills were intended by Congress to be a
permissible means of publication.' 0
The Board and the courts have with virtual unanimity declared
handbilling of a neutral employer to be lawful as long as it meets
stated requirements. In Lohman Sales Co.'0 the union hand-
96. Id. at 87-88.
97. 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
98. PALM SPRINGS, CAL., ORDIwNNcE 395, August 27, 1958.
99. The dates of cases cited in the text should be noted (ed.).
100. 105 CONO. REc. 17898 (1959).
101. 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
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billed the retail stores to which Lohman delivered certain goods,
asking the public not to buy his goods. Lohman claimed that the
handbilling was tantamount to picketing and therefore was not pro-
tected by the proviso. The Board cited Senator Kennedy's remarks to
the Senate and concluded that the legislative history had made it
"abundantly clear that mere handbilling is not picketing but is em-
braced by the term 'publicity' which is protected by the proviso."'
102
The Board ruled that even though such conduct might threaten,
coerce, or restrain an employer, as long as it was permissible publicity
it was protected by the proviso.
The union's handbilling activity does not have to be aimed only
at the goods being sold by the neutral employer that are identified
with the primary employer. With handbills, as with all other permis-
sible forms of publicity, unions can request the public to cease deal-
ing with the neutral employer as long as he deals with the employer
with whom the union is engaged in a dispute. This is in complete
contrast with the form secondary consumer picketing must take, as
mandated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fruit Packers and
Warehousemen, Local 760.3
This point was iustrated in Industrial Electrical Service
(1961),"' a case in which a union had a labor dispute with two
contractors who helped to construct a supermarket. The union
handbilled at the completed market asking the public not to patron-
ize it. The Board found that the handbilling was protected by the
proviso. Although the intent of the union was to force the super-
market to cease all dealings with the contractors0 5 for maintenance
or future construction, the publicity was protected since it met all
statutory requirements and was of permissible form.
The distribution of handbills, even if the handbills fulfill
statutory requirements, is not absolutely protected. The Board' has
on occasion construed the distribution of handbills to be picketing. In
Staltz Land and Lumber Co.'0 6 the union was ordered to cease
picketing a primary employer. The union then positioned some
of its agents in front of the company's headquarters in cars.
102. Id. at 905.
103. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
104. 134 N.L.R.B. 812 (1961).
105. A violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970) unless protected by
the publicity proviso.
106. 156 N.L.R.B. 388 (1965).
These agents distributed leaflets explaining the labor dispute to any-
one who approached the company offices. The Board found that this
distribution of leaflets constituted picketing, stating that such activity
was designed to prevent potential customers and employees from
entering onto the company's premises, not to inform the public of a
dispute. The Board felt that "patrolling" a location was similar to
picketing it. In William J. Burns International Detective Agency
10 7
the Board found that the distribution of leaflets by a large number of
people at a neutral employer's exhibition was a violation of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Board held that this activity impeded en-
trance and exit to prospective customers. It is, therefore, clear that
"handbilling" will be considered sufficiently similar to picketing to
be impermissible if it impedes ingress and egress. As long as its
primary effect is informational, however, it will be protected by the
proviso.
B. Unfair Lists
A second permissible form of publication under the proviso is
the "unfair list." An unfair list is a list of employers who are
engaged in a labor dispute. The list is usually published by a labor
council; 08 the council circulates this list to affiliated locals and their
members and often to employers with whom the unions deal. The
union hopes that those who receive the list will cease dealing with the
struck employer until he resolves his labor dispute, at which time his
name will be removed from the list.
Northwestern Construction of Washington, Inc. 0 9 concerned
such an "unfair list." The union was engaged in a labor dispute with
a contractor who employed nonunion workers. The contractor, who
was hired primarily by oil companies to build new gas stations, was
placed on an unfair list that was then circulated to various oil compa-
nies in the region. The Board found this publicity lawful, holding
that
the distribution of an unfair list is, like the handbilling there,
a form of publicity other than picketing which similarly serves
to advise the public, including consumers, and members of a la-
bor organization of the existence of a labor dispute."10
In Great Western Broadcasting Corp."' the Board faced a similar
situation. A union and a television station were engaged in a labor
107. 136 N.L.R.B. 431 (1962).
108. A labor council is an association of local unions for the unified promotion
of their common interests.
109. 134 N.L.R.B. 498 (1961).
110. Id. at 500.
111. 134 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1961).
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dispute. The union placed the businesses that advertised on the
television station on the local trade council's unfair list. The list also
contained the suggestion that customers return credit cards of
any of the station's advertisers. Some customers complied with this
request. The Board ruled that such a means of publication was
lawful, declaring:
The proviso specifically states that the request not to use a prod-
uct is protected where the purpose is to truthfully advise the
public, including consumers and members of a labor organiza-
tion, that a product or products are produced by an employer.
It is therefore clear that the Act specifically enables a union
which is involved in a primary dispute to seek assistance in




A third form of publicity that is permissible under the proviso is
the use of "sound trucks.""'  The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the use of a sound truck as a permissible means of
communication. In Saia v. New York" 4 the Court declared: "Loud-
speakers are totally indispensable instruments of effective public
speech. The sound truck has become an accepted method of political
campaigning."1' 5 In Kovacs v. Cooper"' the Court recognized the
right of a citizen to use sound trucks to express his views on matters
that he considered of interest to himself and the community. The
Court felt that there was no question that this form of communication
is protected by the freedom of speech guarantee of the first amend-
ment. But, as discussed above, the use of sound trucks can be
regulated.
D. Newspaper Advertising, Radio and Television Broadcasts
A fourth form of publicity that is widely accepted as being
protected within the meaning of the proviso is the use of news-
paper advertisements. 1 7  In Schepps Grocery Co." 8 the union
handbilled a neutral employer's store, asking the public not to buy the
112. Id. at 1621.
113. Cox, supra note 24, at 274.
114. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
115. Id. at 561.
116. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
117. 105 CONG. REc. 17898 (1959).
118. 133 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1961).
primary employer's goods. It also placed a full page advertisement in
the local newspaper. After reviewing the legislative history of the
1959 amendments, the Board found that this newspaper advertise-
ment fell within the protection of the proviso."'
The last generally accepted forms of publicity are radio and
television broadcasts. Senator Kennedy's report to the Senate provid-
ed a very strong indication that this form of publicity would be
acceptable.12 ° Professor Cox in his assessment of the forms of
publicity that the conference committee intended to allow also
included radio broadcasts as one of the lawful forms. 2' Also in
1960, the General Counsel of the Board, Stuart Rothman, discuss-
ing the objectivity of union publication, included radio advertise-
ments among the forms of publicity protected by the proviso.'22
In Sakowitz, Inc. 2' the Board, while not dealing with radio or
television advertisements as a form of publicity, stated that such
publicity was within the scope of the proviso.
E. Other Forms of Publicity
Several additional means of publication are perhaps legitimate,
although the case law is unsettled. In Packard Bell Electronics
Corp. 24 a union agent taped a placard onto his car urging cus-
tomers not to buy the goods of the primary employer from the
neutral employer. The car was parked directly in front of the neutral
employer's store and was clearly visible to all customers. The Board's
trial examiner found that this form of publicity was similar to that
of picketing and, because potential customers could not avoid seeing
the placard, he found it to be illegal. The Board did not adopt this
view, but upheld the finding pro forma because the union failed to
contest it. In light of the fact that other permissible forms of pub-
licity are also thrust upon a potential customer, the finding by the
trial examiner is contrary to the Board's stated policy.
Another interesting form of publicity, one which the Board up-
held as being within the publicity proviso, was employed in Hawaii.
In Hawaii Press Newspaper Inc.'25 the union was engaged in a labor
119. The Board reached this conclusion after reviewing the legislative history of
the 1959 amendments, particularly Senator Kennedy's statement. In Sakowitz, Inc.,
174 N.L.R.B. 362 (1969), the Board, while discussing the effect of handbilling reaf-
firmed that newspaper advertising was within the scope of the proviso.
120. The Senator said, "In other words, the union . . . can make announce-
ments over the radio .... ." 105 CONG. REC. 17898 (1959).
121. Cox, supra note 24.
122. Address by Stuart Rothman, before the Institute on "Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959" sponsored by Emory University School of
Law, at the Lawyers Club of Atlanta, Georgia, February 12, 1960.
123. 174 N.L.R.B. 362 (1969).
124. 132 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1961).
125. 167 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1967).
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dispute with a newspaper company. In addition to handbilling and
picketing the union engaged in several native musicians and singers to
perform on a truck in front of the marketplace in which the advertis-
ers conducted business. The show attracted a large crowd, which
effectively blocked the entrance to the marketplace. The Board
found that this type of "publicity" was not unlawful, stating that this
was the type of entertainment for which Hawaii was famous and
which tourists were encouraged to watch. Since the show was peace-
ful and there were no arrests despite the size of the crowd, the Board
concluded that the show constituted publicity within the protection
of the proviso. It is unlikely, however, that the Board would routinely
find similar forms of entertainment protected by the proviso, since
it has found the blocking of ingress and egress to a neutral employer
by a large crowd unlawful in another case.' 26
F. Combined Forms of Publicity-Handbilling and Picketing
While the Board's discussions indicate that almost any form of
publicity that is normally considered protected by the first amend-
ment's free speech guarantee will be upheld, a different result may
ensue when such publicity is combined with illegal publicity. This
question has arisen most often in the context of handbilling combined
with picketing. When permissible this is the most effective form of
publicity utilized by a union. If the picketing is lawful and the
handbills meet all of the statutory. requirements, this activity is lawful.
But often the picketing is illegal. In most instances this occurs
because the picket sign calls for a total boycott of the neutral employ-
er. Such illegal picketing can have a number of effects on otherwise
proper handbilling.
Most Board decisions indicate that even though the picketing
used by the union is illegal, the handbilling which accompanies it is
still protected by the proviso. In Minneapolis House Furnishing
ICo.1"7 the union picketed and handbilled retail companies in an
attempt to boost the sale of locally made union goods. The Board
found the picketing violative of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B)' 2 s but
ruled that the accompanying handbilling was not illegal. The
handbilling never became part of the picketing. The picketing and
126. The William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 136 N.L.R.B. 431 (1962).
127. 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961).
128. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 704(a), 73
STAT. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1970).
handbilling remained two distinct and separate forms of publicity.
The one form (picketing) was designed to induce workers to engage
in a work stoppage and to coerce the employer in the conduct of his
business. The other form (handbilling), was addressed to the public
and did not presume to induct employees or coerce employers. The
handbilling remained protected by the proviso.
A similar situation was at issue in Sardec, Inc.,'29 in which a
union picketed and handbilled a retail store that was building another
of its franchise stores with nonunion help. The picketing was found
unlawful because it advocated a boycott against the entire store and
all its products. 13 0 The General Counsel of the Board urged that the
handbilling not be protected because the handbills advised the public
of the unlawful activity of the union. The Board concluded that the
handbilling was protected by the proviso even though it was used in
conjunction with the unlawful picketing.
In the Minneapolis and Sardec cases the Board determined that
the two forms of publicity, though found in physical conjunction,
could be severed to determine the legality of each under the proviso.
In other cases, however, the Board and the courts have not severed
the two forms of publicity. Because of the circumstances in which
these forms of publicity are found, the Board and the courts have
declared them to be so intermingled that they must be dealt with
as only one form-usually picketing.
When the handbilling has become so intimately connected with
the picketing as to leave them indistinguishable, both are considered
illegal. This is true despite the fact that the handbilling alone would
be permissible. In Castner-Knott Dry Goods Store"' the union's
picket signs asked the public to take a leaflet from one of the union's
handbillers. The handbill called for a total boycott of the retail store.
The Board concluded that the picketing and handbilling were both to
be considered picketing since they were designed by the union to
work together. Both the picketing and handbilling, when considered
together as picketing, were unlawful because they called for a total
consumer boycott of the neutral employer.
Similarly, in Kroger Co. v. NLRB,"' 2 the Sixth Circuit found
that handbilling and picketing could not be separated. This case
129. 192 N.L.R.B. 6 (1971).
130. This picketing was not of the type allowed by the United States Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Fruit & Veg. Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S.
58 (1964). The court ruled that pickets could not advocate a total boycott of the
neutral employer, only a boycott of the primary employer's goods that were being
sold by the neutral employer.
131. 188 N.L.R.B. 470 (1971).
132. 477 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1973).
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involved union picketing and handbilling of a retailer who had moved
into a store constructed by a contractor with whom the union had a
labor dispute. The retailer had already agreed to a contract with the
contractor and could not appease the union without breaching the
contract and violating section 8(b)(4)(A).1 33  The Board. 4 had
found that the picketing was illegal, because it attempted to coerce
the neutral employer by asking the public not to deal with him, but
that the handbilling, which also coerced the employer, was pro-
tected by the proviso. Consequently the Board held that the
handbilling and picketing were separable and subject to different
findings.
The court of appeals disagreed, however, finding that the objec-
tives of the picketing and handbilling were not severable. Both
conveyed substantially the same message and were conducted simulta-
neously in the same general area. These factors, when combined
with the picketing's unlawful objective, constituted a violation of sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B). The court's reasoning leans heavily upon the fact
that the neutral employer was in an impossible position: it could
not appease the union without violating the law.
13 5
On occasion picketing that advocates a boycott of only the
primary employer's goods (i.e., picketing that would normally be
legal) is found illegal when it is considered in conjunction with law-
ful handbilling. This is usually because the picket signs do not
clearly identify the fact that the picketing is aimed only at the goods
of the struck employer, while the handbills call for a total boycott
of the neutral employer. In California Newspapers, Inc.' 36 the
union was engaged in a labor dispute with a newspaper. The union
picketed and handbilled the stores of the newspaper's advertisers.
The picket signs contained a copy of the store's advertisement in the
struck paper. The handbills asked the public not to buy the adver-
tised products but did not identify them. The Board found that
since the picket signs did not delineate which products the public
was being asked not to buy, they seemed to be calling for a total
133. If the employer had entered into an agreement with the labor union, both
parties would have been guilty of a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
134. 195 N.L.R.B. 900 (1972).
135. The neutral employer could only appease the union by breaching its con-
tract with the primary employer for maintenance work. The primary employer had
no more real construction work to do. The union's effort here seems to be either
retaliatory or as a warning to future contractors.
136. 188 N.L.R.B. 673 (1971).
boycott of the store, especially when taken in conjunction with the
handbills. The picketing was deemed as calling for a total boycott
and was therefore a violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). A similar
result was reached in Urban Distributors, Inc.,"87 in which picket
signs stated that the union was "On Strike" and listed the company
against whom the strike was directed. The handbills threatened
more picketing if the stores failed to. cooperate. The Board con-.
cluded that the union picket signs failed to specify that the public
was being asked not to buy only certain goods.
VI. Conclusion
Since the Supreme Court's resolution of the major ambiguities
in the publicity proviso in 1964, the scope of the proviso has not
been significantly altered. The forms of publicity that unions may
utilize are well established. Any form of publicity, with the excep-
tion of picketing, that is subject to protection under the first amend-
ment will be protected by the proviso. All forms of publicity are
subject to reasonable regulation by the state when necessary to pro-
tect the peace and safety of its citizens.
The publicity must fulfill certain requirements in order to come
within the protection of the proviso. The publicity must evolve from
a labor dispute, it must be substantially accurate, and it cannot be
intended to induce employees to cease performing the services for
which they have been hired. Publicity need not, however, be geo-
graphically restricted.
Unlawful picketing found in conjunction with handbilling
does not necessarily render the handbilling illegal. On occasion,
however, the courts have determined that the two are so closely
related that the handbilling has become part of the picketing and
should be treated as such. Ambiguously worded picket signs, when
combined with a call for a total boycott in accompanying handbills,
will cause the otherwise legal picketing to be declared unlawful.
Most cases involving publicity can be correctly analyzed by
applying fairly specific standards . to the publicity being utilized.
The publicity, with the exception of picketing, may call for a total
boycott of the neutral employer as long as it fulfills all statutory
requirements. Any form of publicity that is protected by the free
speech guarantee of the first amendment is legal, albeit subject
to reasonable regulation by the state.
JAMES 0. IAuscH
137. 206 N.L.R.B. 245 (1973).
